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Abstract: We analyze the impact of changing employment patterns and pension reforms on 
the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts in Germany. The analysis is based on 
a rich dataset that combines household survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
Study (SOEP) and process-produced microdata from the German pension insurance. A 
microsimulation model is developed which accounts for cohort effects in individual 
employment and unemployment and earnings over the lifecycle as well as the differential 
impact of recent pension reforms. Cohort effects for individuals born between 1937 and 1971 
vary greatly by region, gender and education and strongly affect lifecycle wage profiles. The 
largest effects can be observed for younger cohorts in East Germany and for the low 
educated. Using simulated life cycle employment and income profiles, we project gross 
future pensions across cohorts taking into account changing demographics and recent 
pension reforms. Simulations show that pension levels for East German men and women will 
fall dramatically among younger birth cohorts, not only because of policy reforms but due to 
higher cumulated unemployment. For West German men, the small reduction of average 
pension levels among younger birth cohorts is mainly driven by the impact of pension 
reforms, while future pension levels of West German women are increasing or stable due to 
rising labor market participation of younger birth cohorts. 
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1 Introduction 
The political debate about the future of the public pension system in Germany has shifted 
from the issue of its financial sustainability to the question whether it will avoid old-age 
poverty, especially among the younger birth cohorts (see, e.g., OECD  2007). There are 
various factors affecting the development of income maintenance in old age. Although the 
pension reforms since 1992 have improved the long-term financial sustainability of the public 
pension system, they have substantially reduced income replacement rates. Furthermore, 
since reunification there has been rising and persistent unemployment particularly in East 
Germany. At the same time, there has been a trend away from the “standard” employment 
relationships covered by social security towards “flexible” work patterns typically not or only 
partially covered by social security, such as “marginal employment”, temporary employment, 
part-time jobs, and self-employment. A recent report commissioned by the Public Pension 
Insurance Fund and the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (AVID 2005) suggests 
that these factors will lead to substantial reductions in the level of public pensions among 
younger birth cohorts, especially in East Germany.  
The goal of the present study is to quantify the likely impact of these developments on 
the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts. To this end, we develop a 
microsimulation model which accounts for cohort effects in individual employment and 
unemployment and earnings over the lifecycle as well as the differential impact of recent 
pension reforms on birth cohorts. To account for cohort effects on the future level of public 
pensions across birth cohorts is important for at least two reasons.  
On the one hand, the impact of the recently enacted pension reforms will affect 
younger birth cohorts to a much greater degree than cohorts already close to retirement. In 
particular, this concerns the demographic adjustment mechanism which determines the level 
of public pensions relative to current wages and the increase of the legal retirement age to 
67 years by 2029. Furthermore, actuarial adjustments for early retirement and phasing out of 
special early retirement options for the unemployed and women were enacted which, given 
the relatively long phase-in period, also had heterogeneous effects on older and younger 
birth cohorts. 
On the other hand, changes in the labor market that occurred during the past decades 
affected cohorts quite differently. One of the most obvious examples for the potential 
importance of cohort effects is the worsening of the labor market situation in East Germany 
in the aftermath of reunification. Birth cohorts in East Germany differ with respect to the 
share of their working life spent in the former GDR where open unemployment was virtually 
nonexistent and wages relatively equally distributed. Both factors as well as the politically 
mandated equalization of GDR pension entitlements to West German levels resulted in 
relatively high and uniform pension entitlements of East Germans already near the early   2
retirement age when they were integrated into the West German public pension scheme. 
East Germans in the middle of their career were affected quite differently by unification: In 
the first years of the transition, large parts of the economy had to be rebuild under the new 
market based system and caused redundancies and closure of factories on a large scale. 
Endowed with human capital from the former GDR they had to find new jobs in the unified 
labor market. This process, however, turned out to be a slow and the unemployment rate in 
East Germany, on average, is still double the West German level. Furthermore, wage 
convergence almost came to a standstill in the mid-1990s, with a substantial wage 
differential remaining (see Franz and Steiner  2000). In West Germany, the younger birth 
cohorts may also have been affected by the worsening of general labor market conditions. 
However, another cohort effect which might have contributed to differences across birth 
cohorts is the increasing labor force participation among women, especially those with higher 
education. In the German public pension system, cohort effects in employment histories have 
both a direct and indirect effect on the individual pension benefit. The direct effect relates to 
total employment over the life-cycle, the indirect effect works through lower wages due to 
previous unemployment. 
The relevance of these cohort effects, if any, is of course an empirical question and 
depends on the chosen identification strategy which will be described in Section 3. Using a 
large and representative panel data set – the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) – we 
are able to place emphasis on important socio-economic characteristics in addition to the 
birth cohort. We distinguish between East and West Germany and men and women 
throughout our analysis. Furthermore, we analyse the impact of education. Education has a 
well documented effect on both the employment probability and the wage level. In addition to 
the perspective of the individual pension, we simulate pension outcomes also on a 
household level. There we also describe how estimated cohort effects are used to project 
individual employment biographies and earnings which determine the individual pension 
level.  
Our estimation results, summarized in Section 4, show that cohort effects vary greatly 
between region, gender, and education. The estimated cohort effects in individual 
employment patterns affect lifecycle wage profiles used to simulate future earnings for 
cohorts born between 1937 and 1971. Using simulated life cycle employment and income, 
we project gross future pensions across cohorts taking into account changing demographics 
and recent pension reforms. We look mainly at public pensions at the individual level from 
various perspectives. Simulation results show that pension levels for East German men and 
women will fall dramatically among younger birth cohorts, not only because of policy reforms 
but due to higher cumulated unemployment. For West German men, the small reduction of 
average pension levels among younger birth cohorts is mainly driven by the impact of   3
pension reforms, while future pension levels of West German women are increasing or stable 
due to a rising labor market participation of younger birth cohorts. As summarized in the 
conclusion, these results shed light on the adequacy of future public pensions among 
younger age cohorts which is of crucial importance for social policy.  
 
2  Empirical and Institutional Background 
2.1  Evidence on changing work patterns across birth cohorts  
Since reunification Germany has seen high and persistent unemployment with an 
extraordinary increase in long-term unemployment in East Germany. At the same time, full-
time employment has been partially substituted for by part-time jobs and “marginal 
employment” not covered by social security (see, e.g., Rische  1999, Faik  et al.  2001, 
Sachverständigenrat 2008). These labor market developments are likely to reinforce the 
negative impact of recent pension reforms (see Section 2.2) on the level of public pensions 
especially of younger birth cohorts.  
There are a few studies analyzing the impacts of unemployment and changing 
employment patterns on future pension benefits across cohorts for Germany. Most of these 
studies were based on the AVID reports (“Altersvorsorge in Deutschland”) for the years 1996 
and 2005 which investigate public and private pension provision of people aged between 40 
and 60 (DRV 2000, 2007).
1 The studies based on AVID 1996 report a weak negative trend 
for pension entitlements of younger cohorts of men born 1951-55 relative to those born 1936-
40, particularly in East Germany. While younger cohorts of women tend to work more than 
older cohorts in West Germany, a substantial decline in employment and increase in 
unemployment is observed among younger cohorts of women in East Germany. The AVID 
2005 study shows that these trends have continued in recent years: West German women 
continue to increase their labor market participation, in particular part-employment, while 
employment of West German men remains fairly stable across cohorts. For East Germany, 
the trend is negative for both men and women, with a substantial increase in unemployment. 
Using administrative data of recent entry cohorts of pensioners, Himmelreicher and 
Frommert (2006) report similar but weaker trends. Table 1 confirms these developments on 
the basis of retrospective SOEP data on employment histories across birth cohorts by 
gender and region.
2 
                                                  
1  The data are not available for scientific research outside the Public Pension Fund and the Federal 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the two institutions which have jointly commissioned these 
surveys. For a summary of studies based on AVID 1996 see Steiner (2003). 
2   For a description of the SOEP, see Section 3.1.    4
Table 1  Employment histories across birth cohorts by gender and region  
(average cumulated duration in years) 
 Men  Women 
 FTE  UN  FTE  PTE  UN  NE 
W e s t   G e r m a n y         
Age 30 – 34 : year        
Cohort 1951-55 : 1985  9.9  0.3 7.1 1.3 0.3 4.3 
Cohort 1961-65 : 1995  8.6  0.5 6.5 1.5 0.7 2.5 
Cohort 1971-75 : 2005  8.6  0.6 5.6 1.8 0.6 2.4 
Total  9.0 0.5 6.4 1.5 0.5 3.0 
Age 40 – 44 : year        
Cohort 1941-45 : 1985  20.3  0.3  10.4 2.8 0.2  10.2 
Cohort 1951-55 : 1995  18.7  0.6  10.2 3.6 0.5 7.4 
Cohort 1961-65 : 2005  18.0  0.8  10.4 3.9 0.8 5.1 
Total  18.9 0.6  10.3 3.5 0.6 7.3 
Age 50 – 54 : year        
Cohort 1931-35 : 1985  31.6  0.5  13.8 3.6 0.2  15.6 
Cohort 1941-45 : 1995  29.2  0.7  14.0 4.7 0.5  13.4 
Cohort 1951-55 : 2005  27.6  0.9  15.1 6.7 0.9 8.8 
Total  29.4 0.7  14.3 5.0 0.6  12.5 
E a s t   G e r m a n y         
Age 30 – 34 : year        
Cohort 1961-65 : 1995  10.0  0.4 8.7 1.2 0.9 0.7 
Cohort 1966-70 : 2000  9.5  0.8 7.3 1.3 1.4 0.8 
Cohort 1971-75 : 2005  8.5  1.4 6.2 2.1 1.4 0.7 
Total  9.4 0.8 7.6 1.4 1.2 0.7 
Age 40 – 44 : year        
Cohort 1951-55 : 1995  19.9  0.4  17.4 2.5 0.6 0.9 
Cohort 1956-60 : 2000  19.0  1.2  17.0 2.0 1.2 1.1 
Cohort 1961-65 : 2005  18.1  1.8  13.4 3.5 2.6 1.2 
Total  18.9 1.1  15.9 2.7 1.5 1.1 
Age 50 – 54 : year        
Cohort 1941-45 : 1995  31.0  0.6  24.5 5.3 0.8 1.9 
Cohort 1946-50 : 2000  28.5  0.9  24.1 3.5 1.3 1.5 
Cohort 1951-55 : 2005  28.2  1.8  24.2 3.1 2.5 1.2 
Total  29.3 1.1  24.3 4.0 1.5 1.5 
Notes: FTE = full-time employment, PTE = part-time employment, UN = unemployment, 
NE = non-employment. The first year observation for West Germany refers to 1985, for 
East Germany to 1995. 
Source: SOEP 1984 – 2006, own calculations. 
For each age group and given calendar year, the table shows the average cumulated 
duration of the respective labor market state, and how the duration has changed across birth 
cohorts. Note that the first year of observation for East Germany (1995) differs from that for 
West Germany (1985), and hence results for the two regions are strictly comparable for the 
years 1995 and 2005 only. Labor market states are differentiated by full-time employment   5
and unemployment for men and additionally by part-time employment and non-employment 
for women.  
As a result of the employment system in the former GDR, employment patterns of older 
cohorts do not show large gender differences in East Germany. Furthermore, the evolution of 
employment patterns of East German men and women is very similar. We observe a 
particularly strong increase in unemployment in East Germany and a decrease in 
employment for men and women, both in absolute and relative terms. For example, in the 
age group 40-44 years the cumulated duration of unemployment increases, on average, from 
0.4 to 1.8 years for men and from 0.6 to 2.6 for women. This is in stark contrast to West 
Germany, where we observe only a slight reduction in employment and a small increase in 
unemployment for men and even a positive development for women. Women increase their 
cumulated employment experience while times of non-employment decrease markedly over 
cohorts. For example, women aged 50-54 have cumulated about ten years of unemployment 
and non-employment by 2005, while in 1985 the same age group had cumulated about 16 
years of non-employment and unemployment. 
How will the weakening of full-time employment and increasing unemployment among  
younger birth cohorts affect future levels of public pensions? As described in the next 
section, the German public pension system implies a fairly close relationship between an 
individual’s lifetime earnings and the level of her own public pension. This relationship 
implies that unemployment may affect individual pension entitlements in two ways: First, by 
reducing the employment years counted towards individual pension entitlements and, 
secondly, by negatively affecting the life-cycle wage profile. Regarding this latter effect, 
empirical studies by Licht and Steiner (1992), Beblo and Wolf (2002), and Wunder (2006) 
indicate that unemployment or non-employment spells have significant long-term effects on 
an individual’s future earnings, and that these effects tend to be the stronger, the longer 
these spells have lasted. The illustrative calculations presented in Wunder (2006) also show 
how the increasing importance of unemployment among younger age cohorts may affect 
their future pension levels. 
2.2  The German PAYG pension system – structure and reforms 
The public pension scheme in Germany is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system.
3 As such, 
population ageing is expected to put pressure on its financial sustainability in the coming 
decades, mainly due to three factors: rising life expectancy, very low fertility rates (between 
                                                  
3   For a more detailed account of the German public pension system and recent reforms, see, e.g., 
Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999).   6
1.3 and 1.4), and a baby boomer generation reaching the retirement age in the coming 
years. As reinforcing negative factors, Germany has experienced a long-term increase in 
unemployment and a very low effective retirement age. 
Policy has responded to these developments by enacting a series of pension reforms. 
These reforms go mainly in two directions: first, the extension of the working life, and second, 
the gradual lowering of the pension level. Starting in 1992, actuarial adjustments for early 
retirement were introduced with a relatively long phase-in period. Furthermore, the phasing 
out of special early retirement options for the unemployed and women was enacted. In 2001, 
a small subsidized pre-funded pillar of private pensions was introduced (“Riester pension”). 
In 2004, the benefit indexation was changed by introducing a so called sustainability factor 
that takes into account the development of the ratio of contributors to the pension system 
and its recipients. According to the new benefit indexation rule, pensions will grow at a lower 
rate than wages as long as this ratio declines. In 2007, a law came into effect that increases 
the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 until 2029.  
Public pension benefits in Germany are closely linked to an individual’s lifetime 
employment and wage income relative to average wages in the economy, with relatively few 
redistributive elements. The Pension Benefit (PB) payment in year s after retirement is the 
product of four factors: the sum of Pension Points ( PP) acquired at retirement age T, a 
Pension Type factor (PT), an Entry Factor (EF) and the Current Pension Value (CPV). It is 
calculated according to the following formula: 
1
,   0,1 , ,
T
Ts t T T
t
PB PP PT EF CPV s S +
=
⎛⎞
=× × × = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑ K  
For old-age pensions PT=1, and it is less than unity for other pension types, e.g., a widow’s 
pension. In the following, we will only analyze old-age pensions. EF is equal to one if the age 
at retirement equals the statutory retirement age and lower for early retirement. For each 
month (year) of early retirement the benefit is lowered by 0.3% (3.6%).
4  
The most important component in the above formula is the sum of individual PP which 
mainly accrue from social security contributions levied on own wage income. Individual PP in 
a given year are calculated as the ratio of individual annual earnings and this year’s average 
of annual earnings in the whole economy, i.e. the person’s relative wage position. Thus, if a 
person earns the average wage in a given year she receives one PP. Earnings are only 
subject to social security contributions if they exceed a lower limit and contributions have to 
be paid only up to a higher limit. Both limits restrict the feasible number of PP to lie roughly in 
                                                  
4   In Section 3.3, we provide some descriptive evidence on the significance of early retirement and 
how we treat the retirement decision in our simulation.   7
the range between 0.15 and 2. Thus, the accumulation of PP depends on an individual’ wage 
profile relative to the evolution of average wages as well as the pattern of employment and 
unemployment over the life cycle.  
PP may also be acquired during spells of unemployment and non-employment due to 
child rearing activities. For example, a mother receives one pension point for the first three 
years of a child born after 1992. The treatment of periods of unemployment has changed 
over time. Currently, short-term unemployed persons receiving the unemployment benefit 
(ALG I, which is insurance based and related to previous earnings) acquire PP as if earning 
80% of the former gross wage. In contrast, since the recent reform in 2005 long-term 
unemployed receiving the new means-tested unemployment assistance payment (ALG  II) 
acquire very little pension entitlements equivalent to a bit more than 2 € per month. This is 
another example of how the impact of reforms on future pensions may differ across birth 
cohorts.
5 
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where  W is the sum for gross wages in the economy, RP is the contribution rate to 
subsidized private and/or occupational pension schemes, CR is the contribution rate to the 
public pension fund, PR is the ratio of retirees to contributors to the public pension fund, and 
α is a weighting factor currently set to 0.25. In our base year 2005 the CPV amounted to 
26.13 € in West Germany and to 22.57 €in East Germany.
6  
The determination of the CPV has been subject to a couple of reforms.
7 The 
introduction of the subsidy of contributions to private pension plans (“Riester pension”) is 
reflected by the factor RP. This factor lowers the benefit indexation, even though the 
supplementary private pension is not mandatory. The contribution rate is set to increase to 
                                                  
5   Between 2000 and 2004, PP acquired while receiving means-tested unemployment benefits were 
caculated on the basis of the benefit amount and not on the prior income. 
6   The lower CPV in East Germany is intended to compensate for the higher pension points given to 
East Germans by increasing their individual wages by an “adjustment factor” which should account 
for the still substantially lower level of the average wage in East Germany. Currently this 
adjustment factor amounts to about 18%, whereas the regional differential of average wages is 
about 15%. Thus, despite the lower CPV, individual pension contributions in East Germany are 
actually treated more generously in the pension formula than in West Germany. In our simulations 
we keep these regional differences in the CPV and the mentioned adjustment factor constant.  
7   In this paper, we only focus on gross pensions and ignore taxation. Therefore we do not model the 
long-term reform of the tax treatment of pensions in 2004. An analysis of that reform can be found 
in Buslei and Steiner (2006).   8
4% of gross earnings until 2011 and remains constant thereafter. The 2004 reform 
introduced the sustainability factor which links pension growth to demographic ageing. 
Demographic ageing will most likely reach its peak in the 2030s which results in a growth 
rate of pensions that is lagging behind the growth rate of wages. This implies lower individual 
replacement rates on average. Due to the complex rule for the adjustment of the CPV, it’s 
future trajectory has to be simulated making assumptions on the changes of all factors that 
enter the adjustment rule (see Section 3.3).  
 
3  Data and Microsimulation Methodology 
3.1 Data 
According to the pension formula discussed in the previous section, the simulation of future 
pension benefits requires detailed information of current individual entitlement (the number of 
pension points) as well as estimates of future pension accruals until retirement. The 
estimation of future pension entitlement would have to account for cohort effects in labor 
market histories, future earnings, and the individual retirement age. Since there is no data set 
publicly available in Germany that includes all the required information, we have to combine 
various data sources for the simulation of individual pension benefits. We combine data from 
the SOEP and administrative data of individual insurance records provided by the Research 
Data Center of the Public Pension Fund. SOEP data is used to estimate cohort effects in 
individual labor market histories which indirectly affect lifecycle wage profiles. The 
administrative data are used to determine pension entitlement in our base year (2005) for 
those individuals who can be matched to “statistical twins” observed in the SOEP data and to 
simulate the effective retirement age across birth cohorts. 
The SOEP is a representative longitudinal micro-database that provides a wide range 
of socio-economic information on private households in Germany. Data were first collected 
on about 12,200 randomly selected adult respondents (in 6,000 families) in West Germany in 
1984. After German reunification in 1989, the SOEP was extended by about 4,500 persons 
(in 2,200 households) from the former GDR.
8 SOEP contains a detailed retrospective 
questionaire from which we reconstruct individual employment histories to estimate cohort 
effects. The data we use range from 1984-2006 for West Germany and 1990-2006 for East 
Germany. 
SOEP data do not provide information on wages of the time before the individual joined 
the survey. Thus, individual pension entitlements of non-retirees for the base year 2005 
                                                  
8   A description of the SOEP is provided by Wagner et al. (2007).   9
simulated from retrospective work history data recorded in the SOEP are likely to contain 
substantial measurement error. This is a particular problem for East Germany because it 
does not seem feasible to back-cast wages in the former GDR based on market wages after 
reunification. The calculation of individual pensions in East Germany is also rendered 
extremely difficult due to complex regulations concerning the integration of pension 
entitlements from the former GDR into the unified pension system in Germany.
9 Thus, the 
determination of individual pension entitlements in the base year for East Germans is not 
feasible based on SOEP data alone. Because of the complex pension legislation, to a much 
lesser extent this is also true for West Germany.
10 
We therefore match administrative information on individual pension claims in 2005 to 
the SOEP data. For this purpose we use the so-called insurance account sample of 2005 
(“Versichertenkontenstichprobe”, VSKT 2005) of the Public Pension Fund which is a random 
sample of cleared individual insurance records that comprises about 60,000 observations of 
people aged between 30 and 67 years in 2005.
11 To this end, we applied a propensity-score 
matching procedure (“nearest-neighbor” matching) to combine the data sets of SOEP and 
VSKT for 2005. The data were matched within small cells defined by age-groups, gender, 
region, and education. While the level of education is represented by three categories for 
West Germany, there are only two categories for East Germany since there are only very few 
people with less than secondary education. We provide some information on the matching 
procedure in the appendix. For each observations in the SOEP matched to a statistical twin 
in the VSKT data we replace the simulated amount of pension entitlement by that recorded in 
the latter data base. For SOEP observations for which no statistical twin could be found the 
simulated amount is maintained. 
Finally, we use a 10% random sample (about 90,000 observations) of all new retirees 
in 2006 for the simulation of the age of retirement (see Section 3.3).
12 After restricting the 
sample to old-age pensioners who retired between 60 and 65 years we are left with about 
68,000 observations.  
                                                  
9   Himmelreicher et al. (2007) describe the integration of pension entitlements of former GDR 
citizens. 
10  An example would be the pension rights adjustment after a divorce which occurred before the 
individual joined SOEP. 
11  These data are provided as a scientific use file (SUFVSKT2005) by the Research Data Center of 
the Public Pension Fund. Detailed descriptions of the data are contained in DRV (2008) and 
Himmelreicher and Stegmann (2008). 
12   These data are provided as a scientific use file of the so-called “Versichertenrentenzugang” 
(SUFRTZN06XVSBB) by the Research Data Center of the Public Pension Fund. The data are 
described in DRV (2006).   10
3.2  Estimation of cohort effects and wage equations 
To link individual labor market histories to lifecycle earnings profiles, which determine the 
level of an individual’s future pension, we first estimate the impact of cohort effects on the 
cumulated duration of the various labor market states. In a second step, we estimate relative 
wage equations relating individual wages to labor market histories and a number of other 
potential wage determinants. Our maintained hypothesis is that cohort effects enter the wage 
equation only indirectly through their impact on an individual’s labor market history. We start 
with a brief description of the estimation of cohort effects in labor market histories and then 
describe the modeling of the wage equation. 
Cohort effects 
We assume that the cumulated duration in a particular labor market state, Yit*, can be 
modeled as a linear function of the birth cohort Kit, the individual’s age Ait, period (year) 
dummies Pit and a vector of other control variables, Xit :  
α βββ γε ′ =+ + + + +
*
123 , it it it t it it YK A P X  
where the labor market states are full-time employment and unemployment for men, and 
additionally part-time employment and non-employment for women. The control variables 
include age of the oldest child, dummies for other children, marital status, nationality, and 
education. The error term ε  is assumed to be uncorrelated with these variables. 
Because of the linear dependence of age, period, and cohort the identification of linear 
cohort effects this specification requires a restriction on these effects. Here, we follow Deaton 
(1997) and assume that period effects are orthogonal to a linear trend and sum to zero over 
all observation periods.
13 This assumption allows to decompose the effects in three different 
dimensions: the trend (cohort), the profile (age), and the business cycle (period). 
Since the cumulated duration in most labor market states is zero for a non-neglible 
share of people, we estimate tobit models of the form: 
α βββγε
εσ
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13  This implies the following linear transformation of the period dummies: Pt*= Pt – (t-1)P2 + (t-2)P1, 
with Pt = 1 in period t, and zero otherwise. Alternative ways to identify cohort effecst using panel 
data are discussed in Heckman and Robb (1985), Beaudry and Green (2000), Fitzenberger et al. 
(2004), Alessie et al. (2005), and Boockmann and Steiner (2006).   11
where the original period dummies have been transformed as described above. Estimation of 
this equation is based on 21 waves of the SOEP for West Germany and 15 waves for East 
Germany spanning the period 1984-2005 and 1990-2005, respectively. People in education 
or already retired as well as civil servants and the self-employed are not included in the 
analysis. We estimate separate tobit models for each of the sub-groups defined by region 
(East and West German), gender, and by the level of education. 
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix report for each of these groups estimated marginal 
effects of the cohort dummies on the cumulated duration in the various labor market states: 
These effects are evaluated at sample means of the explanatory variables in the model 
including age. Thus, these effects give the pure cohort effects on the cumulated duration of, 
e.g., unemployment at a given age. For example, for West German men with low level of 
education the estimated effect for the youngest cohort (1967-71) implies that, evaluated a 
sample means, the cumulated unemployment duration of this group exceeds that of the 
oldest cohort by about 2 years. Estimated cohort effects differ significantly by gender, region, 
and the level of education. In East Germany, for example, estimated effects imply almost 
5 years more unemployment relative to the oldest age cohort for the youngest cohort of men 
with low or medium level of education, compared to about 2  years for those with higher 
education. For East German women the corresponding estimated cohort effects are about 
8 years and 3 years respectively. Tables A2 and A3 also show large differences in estimated 
cohort effects across gender, region and level of education regarding the cumulated labor 
market states. The implications of estimated cohort effects for employment and 
unemployment over the life-cycle will be discussed in Section 4.1.  
Wage equations 
The dependent variable in the wage equation is the log of the ratio of the individual monthly 
gross wage in a given year to the average wage of the insured population in that period.
14 
Explanatory variables are age, the cumulated duration of unemployment and (in case of 
women) non-employment and part-time employment, all entered as polynomials of degree 
three. Since we include these as well as age the duration of full-time cannot be identified 
separately. Cohort effects impact on individual relative wages through their effects on the 
duration variables. The control variables contained in Xit include time dummies, dummies for 
                                                  
14  We use this uncensored wage measure in the estimation although we calculate the expected wage 
accounting for the censoring at the lower and upper social security thresholds in the simulations 
below. Using all observations avoids estimating a double-censored regression model and takes 
advantage of all available information in the estimation.   12
industry, firm size, and nationality.
15 Unobserved wage determinants are modeled by the two 
error components ui and vit which are assumed to be independently normally distributed. The 
specification of the wage equation thus is: 
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This equation is estimated on a sub-sample of observations also used for the estimation of 
cohort effects, i.e. those people for whom we observe a wage subject to social security 
contributions. Civil servants and the self-employed are not included. As in the estimation of 
cohort effects, we estimate separate relative wage equations for each of the sub-groups 
defined by region, gender, and the level of education.  
As shown by Figure A1 in the appendix, the empirical age-earnings profiles derived 
from our estimated relative wage equations differ substantially by education.
16 The higher its 
level, the higher the individual wage relative to the average wage in the economy and, 
hence, the higher the acquired number of pension points. Although this relationship holds for 
men and women in East and West Germany throughout the life-cycle after the first few years 
of employment, the slope of the age-earnings profile differs markedly between these groups. 
Age-earnings profiles are relatively flat for persons with low or medium education and fairly 
steep for higher educated people. These profiles differ substantially by gender and region, 
however, especially for people with higher education. In West Germany, relative wages of 
men in this group continuously increase with age until the age of sixty and will have almost 
doubled by then. In contrast, higher educated women experience a steep wage increase until 
their early thirties followed by a reduction and a subsequent rebound in their relative wage. 
This pattern can be explained by the relatively weak labor force participation and a high 
share of part-time employed West German women in their thirties and early forties due to 
child-care responsibilities. Since this used to be, and still is, much less true for women in 
East Germany, their age-earnings profiles are, on average, similar to those of East German 
men. For West German men and women with low education, relative wages remain flat or 
                                                  
15  Industry and firm-size dummies are normalized (“orthogonalized”) so that setting them all equal to 
zero yields their average effect on the relative wage. This normalization is used in the simulations 
below to predict wages of individuals for whom we currently do not observe wages, i.e. we assume 
that their expected wage equals the average wage with respect to these characteristics. 
16  Detailed estimation results for the relative wage equations are available from the authors upon 
request.   13
even decrease with age, and slightly increase for men with a medium level of education. In 
East Germany, relative wages of both men and women with low or medium education also 
change relatively little over the life-cycle.  
On the one hand, these differences in empirical age-earnings profiles imply that people 
with low level of education accumulate little earnings potential over their life-cycle, in contrast 
to higher educated people. On the other hand, flat age-earnings profiles also imply that 
employment interruptions have relatively small effects on future earnings and thus the level 
of the public pension. 
3.3  Simulating future pension levels across birth cohorts 
Together with individual pension entitlements in 2005, the estimates from the previous 
section are used to simulate the level of individual pensions at retirement age. Note that the 
simulation horizon varies greatly between birth cohorts. Whereas the majority of our oldest 
cohort (1937-41) is already retired in 2005, and their pensions can be observed, the 
youngest birth cohort (1967-71) is aged 34-38  in that year and up to 33 years of their future 
employment/unemployment spells and earnings have to be simulated. This simulation 
involves various steps.  
First, we project future individual work patterns on the basis of estimated labor market 
histories accounting for cohort effects. This projection is based on our estimated tobit models 
to predict for each individual in our sample unconditional expected durations in labor market 
state j at age t until retirement age, conditional on a set of explanatory variables Z which 
include cohort effects. Let this expected value be denoted by E(Yjt|Zjt). The time spent in a 
particular state at age t is then calculated as the difference of the expected values at age 
t and (t -1) as max[0,yjt=E(Yjt|Zjt)-E(Yji,t-1|Zj,t-1)].  
Second, we simulate future relative earnings for each individual in our sample based 
on expected values (not conditionally on employment) derived from our estimated wage 
equations. These simulations are based on the simulated cumulated durations derived in the 
previous step. For example, an individual’s expected cumulated duration of unemployment at 
age  t  determines, together with the other explanatory variables in the wage equation 
evaluated at that age, the individual’s expected relative wage. In addition to the mean we 
also simulate the variance of projected wages on the basis of the distribution of wages 
observed in our estimation sample.
17  
                                                  
17  This is done by randomly drawing residuals from the distributions of the error terms ui and vit and 
adding them to the simulated wages.    14
Third, putting together simulated future employment/unemployment durations and 
earnings at age t we calculate for each individual the number of pension points until her 
retirement age. Adding these – adjusted by the number of pension points acquired for non-
employment spells – to the number of already acquired pension points in the base year 2005 
yields the expected total number of pension points an individual is expected to earn until 
retirement. Since early retirement is still the rule rather than the exception in Germany, 
despite the associated substantial reduction of the pension entitlement (see Section   2.2), we 
have to model the future evolution of the effective retirement age.  
We do this in a simplified way by extrapolating the distribution of the effective 
retirement age of people retiring in 2006 (see Figure A2 in the Appendix) by a common factor 
that should reflect the recently enacted long-term increase of the statutory retirement age 
from 65 to 67 years (see Section   2.2).
18 Since we focus on old-age pensions here, we apply 
the same factor to men and women and – in our base scenario – also to East and West 
Germany.
19 Since the average effective retirement age in 2006 was about 63 years, this 
implies a long-term increase to 65 years in the simulation. As shown by Figure  1, the 
expected increase in the effective retirement age is not linear. This is due to the abolishment 
of early retirement options for unemployed and women, which implies a relatively strong 
increase in the expected retirement age of people in the birth cohorts 1947-56.  
                                                  
18  It is difficult to quantify the effects of the recent pension reforms effective retirment age in the 
distant future. Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2004) estimate that the pension reforms in 1992 and 
1999 which enacted the adjustment factors for early retirement pensions have increased the 
average retirement age by two years for men and less than one year for women. In 2006, the 
average retirement age of women was actually above and that for men below the values implied by 
these estimates. Gender differences in changes of the retirement age could be related to the 
inclusion of disability pensions in these estimates. For old-age pensions, there is a clear positive 
trend in the effective retirement age for both men and women. 
19  In the more optimistic labor market scenario for East Germany discussed in Section 4.4 below we 
assume that the effective retirement age converges between the two regions.   15
Figure 1  Adjustment of the effective to changes in the legal retirment age 
 
Fourth, based on the simulated individual pension points and projections of the current 
pension value we derive individual pension benefits. As discussed in Section   2.2, the current 
pension value (CPV) is determined by the growth rate of the average gross wage in the 
economy and some adjustment factors to the pension formula. Following the Ageing Working 
Group (AWG), the average real gross wage in the economy is projected to grow at an annual 
rate of 1.6 % (European Commission 2005). Given this projection, the CPV is calculated 
using the formula in Section   2.2.  
Figure 2 shows the development of gross wages and the CPV in the simulation period. 
Due to the adjustment factors in the pension formula, there is an increasing divergence 
between the average gross wage and the CPV. Since population aging will peak during the 
2030s, and this is accounted for in the „sustainability factor“ included in the CPV formula, the 
difference between gross wages and the CPV will reach a maximum towards the end of the 
simulation period. By then, the CPV will fall short of the average gross wage by almost 20 
percentage points.   16
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The final step in the calculation of future public pensions is to project the population structure 
over the whole simulation period. Starting with a representative sample of the German 
population born between 1937 and 1971 we apply a “static ageing” procedure which adjusts 
the SOEP weighting factors to the marginal distributions of a few demographic variables 
derived from a household projection of DIW Berlin (see Buslei et al. 2007, pp. 29-33). These 
variables include the age, gender and education of the household head, region of residence, 
and type of household (couples/singles, with/without children). The static aging procedure 
uses a reweighting procedure developed by Merz et al. (2004).  
 
4 Simulation  Results 
4.1  Employment and unemployment until retirement 
As described in Section 3.3, for the younger birth cohorts we have to simulate a large part of 
their labor market behavior until retirement. Starting from our base year 2005 and using the 
estimated cohort effects we simulate for each individual the cumulated employment and 
unemployment durations until the expected individual retirement age. In our base scenario 
we assume that these cohort effects estimated over a period of high and increasing 
unemployment, especially in East Germany, also determine future labor market behavior 
across birth cohorts. In the following simulation of the cumulated employment and 
unemployment durations the individual retirement age differs across age cohorts but is   17
assumed to be determined by the current legal retirement age of 65 years. This assumption 
will be relaxed when we simulate the level of pension benefits below.  
Table 2 summarizes our simulation results for full-time employment and unemployment 
by region, gender and the level of education.
20 Simulation results for cohorts refer to future 
populations in the year of retirement. They are derived using the method of static aging to 
adjust SOEP weighting factors to account for demographic change (Section 3.3). Differences 
in simulation results across birth cohorts thus not only represent pure cohort effects but also 
structural changes in the population across cohorts.
21 
Table 2  Simulated years of cumulated employment/unemployment durations until retirement  
  West Germany  East Germany 





Education level:  Low Medium  High Low  Medium High  Low/Medium High  Low/Medium High 
Men                   
Cohort 1937-41  39.1  40.9  35.2  3.7 1.7 0.8  40.4  37.2  2.3  1.4 
Cohort 1942-46  38.6  39.4  34.3  4.0 2.1 1.3  39.4  36.5  3.6  2.1 
Cohort 1947-51  36.4  38.9  33.6  4.6 2.6 1.5  38.7  34.5  4.6  2.9 
Cohort 1952-56  37.4  39.0  33.4  5.4 2.7 1.8  37.9  33.7  6.1  3.0 
Cohort 1957-61  36.4  37.4  32.8  6.6 3.2 2.2  36.2  33.2  7.9  3.9 
Cohort 1962-66  35.3  36.4  33.7  8.2 3.1 2.0  36.1  32.3  8.0  4.1 
Cohort 1967-71  36.5  37.6  32.2  7.2 3.4 2.0  35.7  31.3  9.4  5.2 
Average 37.3  38.9  33.5  5.2  2.6 1.7  37.6  34.3  6.2  3.1 
Women                    
Cohort 1937-41  15.5  15.5  17.4  1.0 0.7 0.5  30.6  34.8  3.1  1.8 
Cohort 1942-46  14.9  16.5  18.7  1.2 0.9 0.7  31.2  32.9  5.4  3.0 
Cohort 1947-51  16.0  17.0  19.7  1.7 0.9 1.0  30.5  33.1  6.9  3.8 
Cohort 1952-56  16.1  16.5  19.1  2.2 1.1 1.4  29.1  32.4  8.9  4.4 
Cohort 1957-61  15.5  16.2  18.7  2.6 1.2 1.3  28.4  31.5  9.9  4.8 
Cohort 1962-66  14.5  16.0  19.1  2.9 1.5 1.3  26.3  28.8  11.5  6.4 
Cohort 1967-71  14.0  16.6  19.8  3.2 1.1 1.0  24.0  26.6  13.3  7.0 
Average 15.2  16.4  19.1  2.1  1.1 1.1  28.4  31.3  8.9  4.7 
Notes: Cumulated durations at the time of retirement under the assumption the legal retirement age is 65 years. 
Simulation results derived using SOEP weighing factors and static aging to forecast future population structure. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, own calculations. 
Simulation results for West German men show that the cumulated duration of employment in 
the younger birth cohorts declines by about 3 years relative to the oldest cohort, and that this 
                                                  
20  To save space, we focus on these two states here. Simulation results for part-time employment 
and non-employment of women are reported and discussed in Steiner and Geyer (2009).   18
decline is similar for all education groups. Differences related to the level of education are 
more pronounced regarding changes in the cumulated duration of unemployment across 
birth cohorts: For people with low education it almost doubles from about 3.7 years in the 
oldest birth cohort to 7.2 years in the youngest cohort. Although the relative change across 
birth cohorts is similar for the other two education groups, the youngest birth cohort of West 
German men with medium education accumulate only about 3 years, those with higher 
education 2 years unemployment until retirement.  
For West German women, changes in the cumulated duration of full-time employment 
across birth cohorts differ by the level of education. In the low education group it falls from 
15.5 years in the oldest cohort to 14 years in the youngest, for women with medium or higher 
education full-time employment increases in the younger birth cohorts. Changes in the 
cumulated duration of unemployment across cohorts also differ by the level of education, 
although the younger cohorts accumulate somewhat more unemployment over their life-cycle 
than the older cohorts in all education groups. Note that the low average level of 
unemployment, relative to both West German men and especially East German women, is 
related to the much greater importance non-employment spells, often related to child-rearing 
activities, have for West German women.
22  
In East Germany, younger male birth cohorts experience a dramatic decline in 
employment and increase in unemployment durations. In the group with low or median 
education, the simulated duration in full-time employment from about 40 in the oldest to less 
than 36 years in the youngest cohort, in the high education group from about 37 to 31 years. 
Correspondingly, the simulated duration of unemployment in the group of persons with low or 
medium education soars from about 2  years in the oldest to more than 9  years in the 
youngest birth cohort. Unemployment also rises sharply for East German men with higher 
education, 1.4 years in the oldest to more than 5 years in the youngest birth cohort. This 
clearly shows the long-term consequences of the catastrophic labor market situation in 
East Germany. 
Even worse seems the likely evolution of employment and unemployment for younger 
birth cohorts of East German women. The simulated duration of full-time employment falls 
                                                                                                                                                       
21  Changes in the simulated cumulated employment and unemployment durations between cohorts 
therefore differ from estimated cohort effects as reported in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix. 
22 The cumulated duration of non-employment of West German women has declined across birth 
cohorts in all education groups. For example, in the high education group non-employment duration 
is estimated to decline from 14  years to about 11  years. In contrast, non-employment of East 
German women in the high education group is expected to increase slightly across cohorts, 
although starting from a very low level of less than 2 years (see Steiner and Geyer  2009, 
Chapter 4.3.1).   19
from more than 30 years in the oldest to 24 years in the youngest cohort for women with low 
or median education, and from almost 35 years to less than 27 years in the high education 
group. The cumulated duration of unemployment of East German women with low or median 
education more than quadruples from about 3 years in the oldest to about 13 years in the 
youngest cohort. The increase in unemployment across birth cohorts is also substantial for 
the high education group for whom the simulated duration increases to 7  years in the 
youngest cohort. This dramatic increase of female unemployment can only partly be related 
to differences in non-employment between East and West Germany. 
4.2  The effects of pension reforms on the average pension level 
The introduction of the demographic adjustment factor in the pension formula and the 
phasing-in of a higher statutory retirement age described in Section    2.2 will have 
heterogeneous effects on individual pension levels across birth cohorts. While the pension 
reductions due to the adjustment factor will be larger for younger birth cohorts, the effects of 
the increase of the statutory retirement age will depend on the adjustment of the effective 
retirement age across birth cohorts. In the following we assume that the effective retirement 
age adjusts to the increase in the statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 years as described 
in Section    2.2, i.e. will also increase by two years over the phase-in period. To get an 
impression on the relative impact of these two policy reforms, Table 3 presents simulated 
pension benefits
23 for four alternative scenarios for West German men. In the first two 
scenarios the statutory retirement age is kept at 65 while the adjustment factor is introduced 
in Scenario I but not in Scenario II. This latter difference also distinguishes Scenario III and 
Scenario IV which also allow for the legislated increase in the statutory retirement age. We 
present these calculations for West German men, for whom we do not find large cohort 
effects in employment and unemployment durations. This allows us to abstract from cohort 
effects in employment histories and disentangle the reform effects in a simple way. For the 
other groups we document simulation results in Table A6 in the appendix. 
The relative stability of employment histories across cohorts is reflected by the stability 
of pension benefits across cohorts under the Scenario  I. In the absence of reforms, the 
pension benefit remains well above 1000 € per month for all cohorts. This changes when the 
legislated slower growth rate of the current pension value due to the demographic 
                                                  
23   As we do not model income taxation in this paper, all pension benefits are gross amounts. 
However, we do substract pensioners’ own contribution to the health and long-term care insurance. 
That is, here and in the following we report the effective amount of pension payment 
(“Rentenzahlbetrag”) in the terminology of the German pension insurance.  
   20
sustainability factor is allowed for. In Scenario  II, the pension level of younger cohorts 
declines relative to the oldest cohort. As expected and shown by the relative change in the 
pension benefit under Scenario I and Scenario II, the negative impact of the introduction of 
the adjustment factor is the bigger, the younger the age cohort. The youngest two age 
cohorts have to bear a reduction in the pension benefit of 13-14  percent due to this 
adjustment factor, compared to an average reduction across all cohorts of less than 
8 percent. 
Table 3  Impact of pension reforms on the average pension benefit by birth cohort –  
West German men 
Scenario  I  II  III  IV  II / I  III / I  IV / I 
  pension benefit (euro per month)  percentage change 
Cohort  1937-41  1,141 1,139 1,141 1,140  -0.2  0.0  -0.1 
Cohort  1942-46  1,126 1,099 1,131 1,104  -2.4  0.4  -2.0 
Cohort  1947-51  1,178 1,111 1,192 1,124  -5.7  1.2  -4.6 
Cohort  1952-56  1,251 1,155 1,288 1,189  -7.7  3.0  -5.0 
Cohort  1957-61  1,170 1,051 1,215 1,091  -10.2  3.8  -6.8 
Cohort  1962-66  1,208 1,054 1,264 1,102  -12.7  4.6  -8.8 
Cohort  1967-71  1,210 1,039 1,269 1,090  -14.1  4.9  -9.9 
Total  1,184 1,094 1,214 1,121  -7.6  2.5  -5.3 
Szenario I   – Retirement age = 65, without adjustment of current pension value (CPV) 
Szenario II  – Retirement age = 65, with adjustment of CPV  
Szenario III – Retirement age = 67, without adjustment of CPV  
Szenario IV – Retirement age = 67, with adjustment of CPV (base scenario) 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations, see text. 
Due to the slow phase-in of the statutory retirement age, which reaches 67 years only in 
2029, the largest effects of this policy change occur for the two youngest birth cohorts. As 
shown by the relative change in the pension value under Scenario  III and Scenario  I in 
Table 3, the extension of the working life reduces the effect of the lower pension growth for 
the two youngest birth cohorts by almost 5.  
Comparing the evolution of pension benefits across birth cohorts under Scenario III and 
Scenario  IV shows that the assumed adjustment of the effective retirement age to the 
increased statutory retirement age partly compensates for the slower CPV growth rate. As 
shown by the column referring to Scenario IV, the net effect of these two policy changes is a 
fairly stable level of pension benefits of West German men across birth cohorts. However 
comparing this scenario to the one without adjustment of the pension formula and increase of 
the retirement age (Scenario  I) reveals that the pension benefit is reduced by almost 
10 percent for the youngest birth cohort, compared to an average reduction of only about 
5 percent across all cohorts.    21
4.3  The level and distribution of pension benefits in the base scenario 
Our simulation results on the level and distribution of pension benefits across birth cohorts 
presented in this section refer to Scenario I which includes the already legislated changes 
concerning the adjustment factor and the increase of the statutory retirement age. In general, 
we report pension benefits at the individual retirement age. In the case of two-person 
households, the simulations refer to the date when both spouses are retired. All pension 
benefits are discounted by the growth rate of real wages to make them comparable across 
birth cohorts. Due to the lower growth rate of pension benefits relative to wages the current 
pension value for younger birth cohorts will decline, although pension benefits will continue to 
grow in real terms. The sample is restricted to persons who were not civil servants or self-
employed in the base year 2005. This restriction excludes very low pensions resulting from 
brief employment spells under the social security system, e.g. of persons who acquired 
pension entitlements at the beginning of their career but subsequently became civil servants. 
The analysis is restricted to own pensions derived from the public pension scheme which are 
by far the most important source of income in old age for the great majority of the population.  
Average pension levels and replacement rates  
Table 4 shows remarkable differences in the amount and the replacement rate of individual 
gross pension benefits stratified by cohort, gender, and region. The replacement rate is 
defined as the ratio of the amount of the pension benefit to the average gross wage in East 
and West Germany, respectively.
24  
Compared to all other groups, West German males across all birth cohorts can expect 
to receive the highest pension benefits. The slight negative trend in this group’s pension 
benefit across birth cohorts is, as analyzed in the previous section, mainly driven by the 
lower CPV growth rate due to the demographic adjustment factor. The youngest cohorts 
receive a pension that is still about 95 percent of the pension of the oldest cohort. The gross 
replacement rate of West German men hovers in the youngest birth cohort still reaches 
about 45 percent and is only 2 percentage points less than the replacement rate of the oldest 
cohort.
25  
The own pension received by women is, on average across all birth cohorts, less than 
half the amount received by men in West Germany. On average, their pension benefit is less 
                                                  
24   The average monthly gross wage in 2005 was 2,433  € in West Germany and 2,057  € in East 
Germany. We use regional wages to account for differences in the cost of living the economy. 
25  Note that this replacement rate links the individual pension amount and the average monthly gross 
wage.   22
than the one received by women in East Germany. In contrast to all other groups, however, 
the pension benefit received by younger cohorts of West German women is substantially 
higher than that obtained by the older cohorts. This is the more remarkable as the older 
cohorts are not affected by the demographic CPV adjustment and shows the importance of 
the increasing labor market attachment of younger women in West Germany. Still, the 
youngest cohort of West German women reaches a replacement rate of only 24 percent. 
Table 4  Pension benefits and replacement rates across birth cohorts by region and gender 
    West Germany  East Germany 
Cohort Average  Men    Women  Men  Women 
  Pension benefit (€ per month) 
1937-41 863  1,140  449 886 646 
1942-46 810  1,104  540 996 720 
1947-51 808  1,124  544 898 792 
1952-56 812  1,189  560 804 708 
1957-61 765  1,091  542 680 706 
1962-66 804  1,102  606 663 592 
1967-71 770  1,090  591 594 466 
Average 804  1,121  554 801 680 
  Replacement rate (in percent) 
1937-41 36.4  46.8 43.1 18.5  31.4 
1942-46 34.8  45.4 48.4 22.2  35.0 
1947-51 34.5  46.2 43.7 22.4  38.5 
1952-56 34.8  48.9 39.1 23.0  34.4 
1957-61 32.7  44.8 33.1 22.3  34.3 
1962-66 34.0  45.3 32.2 24.9  28.8 
1967-71 32.3  44.8 28.9 24.3  22.6 
Average 34.2  46.1 39.0 22.8  33.0 
Notes: The sample is restricted to persons who were not civil servants or self-employed in the base 
year 2005. The replacement rate is the ratio of the monthly pension benefit to the average monthly 
gross wage in East and West Germany, respectively. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations. 
Looking at simulation results for East Germany, the evolution of pension benefits across birth 
cohorts looks much different. Whereas the average pension benefit of East German women 
is almost 700 € per month, and thus more than 100 € above the amount obtained by women 
in West Germany, it is only 466 € for the youngest birth cohort. This is only about 70 percent 
of the pension benefit received by the oldest cohort of women in East Germany. As shown in 
the previous section, about 10  percentage points are due to the net effect of the 
demographic adjustment factor and the increase in the retirement age. Thus, about 
20 percent of the reduction of the pension benefit in the youngest age cohort of East German 
women would be related to increased unemployment and lower wages.    23
For East German males the development is even more dramatic. Whereas East 
German men in the oldest birth cohort reach a pension benefit of about 900 €, birth cohorts 
1952-6 and younger have to expect a substantially smaller amount. The pension benefit of 
the youngest birth cohort of a bit less than 600 € is only two third of the amount received by 
the oldest cohort of East German men. The youngest birth cohort was about to enter the 
labor market when the wall came down and was especially hard hit by the catastrophic 
development of the East German labor market.  
The distribution of individual pension benefits 
Table 5 shows how individual pension benefits are distributed across birth cohorts. To have a 
sufficient number of people in each income class, which we group by intervals of 300 €, we 
have pooled birth cohorts. The upper part of the table contains the distribution of pension 
benefits across all birth cohorts, the middle part for cohorts born 1937-1951, and the lower 
part for cohorts born 1952-1971.  
Table 5  Distribution of pension benefits across birth cohorts by region and gender,  
shares in percent 
    West Germany  East Germany 
Income class (in €)   Total  Men  Women  Men  Women 
  Cohorts 1937-71 
0-300   7.8 0.1  18.0  0.2  1.9 
301-600  23.6 2.3 40.1 19.6  36.7 
601-900  30.7 19.4 32.4 49.1  46.2 
901-1200 23.4 42.9  8.0  25.9  13.5 
1201-1500  9.9 23.2 1.5 4.6  1.6 
1501+  4.6 12.1 0.1 0.6  0.0 
  Cohorts 1937-51 
0-300 11.5 0.3  27.7  0.4  2.6 
301-600 18.4 2.4  36.5  3.5  22.7 
601-900  27.8 20.9 23.2 45.5  54.1 
901-1200 25.6 40.3  9.6  39.7  18.8 
1201-1500  11.3 23.2 2.7 9.5  1.8 
1501+  5.3 12.9 0.3 1.4  0.0 
  Cohorts 1952-71 
0-300 5.0 0.0  11.2  0.0  1.4 
301-600  27.5 2.3 42.6 31.4  46.6 
601-900  32.9 18.1 38.8 51.8  40.7 
901-1200 21.7 45.0  6.8  15.7  9.8 
1201-1500  8.9 23.2 0.7 1.0  1.5 
1501+  4.1 11.4 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Notes:  Income class refers to the individual pension benefit. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations.   24
On average across all cohorts, more than 40 percent of all pension benefits of West German 
men are in the income category 901-1200 €, while almost 50 percent of all men in East 
Germany obtain pensions between 601 and 900  Euro. The share of pensions exceeding 
1200 Euro per month is neglible for women. For men in East Germany, the share of pensions 
exceeding 1200 Euro drops form about 10 percent among the older to almost zero in the 
younger cohorts.  In contrast, about a third of all men in West Germany obtain relatively high 
pensions, and this share changes little between the older and younger age cohorts. 
From a policy perspective, the share of pension benefits below 600  € is important 
because this amount is close to the average means-tested subsistence level for single 
pensioners (“Grundsicherung im Alter”).
26 A single pensioner with an income below that 
threshold would be entitled to receive social assistance up to that limit by the state. Since we 
focus on individual pensions and do not take into account other household incomes we can, 
of course, make no strong statements concerning poverty issues. Still, the extent to which 
own old-age pensions lift the retired out of poverty is of substantial interest for social policy.  
Whereas the share of West German men receiving pensions below 600 Euro is less 
than 3 percent even among younger age cohorts, one out of three East German men in the 
younger birth cohorts will receive a pension below this amount. While this share will change 
little in West Germany, it will increase dramatically from about 4 to more than 30 percent in 
East Germany. The already high share of low pensions among East German women will 
roughly double, from about 25 percent in the older to almost 50 percent in the younger 
cohorts. The share of low pensions is even higher among West German women, although it 
is expected to fall slightly from about 60 in the older to 55 percent in the younger cohorts.  
The distribution of pension benefits by the level of education 
The distribution of pension benefits in the total population disguises important differences by 
the level of education which is one of the major factors shaping life-time earnings. Thus, to 
shed some light on these differences, Table  6 reports means and percentiles of pension 
benefits for the birth cohorts 1952-71. We focus on the younger cohorts here to save space 
and, more importantly, because in these cohorts the share of people with low pensions is 
expected to be extremely high, especially in East Germany.
27  
Looking first at the simulation results for West German men, the group with relatively 
high average pensions, Table 6 reveals that for about a fourth of all people in the group with 
                                                  
26  The Federal Statistical Office reports an average gross amount of 627 € in 2006 for individuals 
aged 65 and older (DESTATIS 2008).   25
a low level of education the expected pension benefit is below 660  €, and thus only 
marginally higher than the minimum pension. Even the median pension of 740 Euro for this 
group is only 100 € above the minimum pension. The distribution of pension benefits among 
East German men with low or medium education is similar as for West German men with low 
education, although the median is even a bit smaller. Compared to West German men with 
medium education, pension benefits in East Germany are substantially smaller at all 
percentiles of the distribution.  
Table 6  Distribution of pension benefits by level of eduction, cohorts 1952-71  
means and percentiles (in € per month) 
   Percentile 
Education  level  Mean  5  10 25 50 75 95 
 Men  West 
Low  761 526 571 657 742 821  1,091 
Medium  1,079  765  826  935 1,046 1,207 1,506 
High  1,281  833  956 1,073 1,253 1,504 1,747 
Total  1,121  688  784  930 1,089 1,290 1,652 
 Men  East 
Low/Medium  746 477 514 600 719 881  1,062 
High  908 550 596 716 886  1,073  1,315 
Total  801 489 535 626 784 940  1,206 
 Women  West 
Low  350 211 230 268 309 376 638 
Medium  569 230 266 387 571 707 987 
High  640 244 328 444 636 808  1,101 
Total  554 223 261 348 527 709  1,020 
 Women  East 
Low/Medium  608 319 398 503 603 700 902 
High  790 478 527 604 751 955  1,182 
Total  680 362 443 549 640 792  1,105 
Overall  total  804 268 332 533 767  1,044  1,481 
Notes:  Percentiles refer to the individual pension benefit. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations. 
As shown by Table 6, the picture is much different for women. Pension benefits of West 
German women with low education are very small: The median in the younger age cohorts is 
only a little more than 300  €, and even the 95 percentile is only a modest amount of 
640 Euro, which exactly amounts to the current value of the minimum pension. These very 
                                                                                                                                                       
27  As already mentioned in Section 3.1, we had to aggregate low and medium levels of education 
levels into one in East Germany because of the small number of people with low education.   26
low pensions result partly from the low wage of women with low education, partly from this 
group’s low attachment to the labor market. This latter factor may also explain the relatively 
low level of pension benefits among West German women with higher education, for whom 
the median is only about 640 €. Pension benefits of East German women with high education 
exceed those of women in West Germany at each percentile of the distribution. Also, East 
German women with low or medium education obtain higher pension benefits than West 
German women with medium education at each percentile in the lower half of the 
distribution. These differences result from the stronger labor market attachment of women in 
East Germany, in particular their higher share of full-time employment.  
Pensions at the household level 
From a policy perspective, the low level of pension benefits of women has to be assessed by 
taking into account other household incomes as well. Small own old-age pensions of women 
need not imply a low living standard. Here, we focus on pension income from the spouse and 
analyze the distribution of pensions benefits at the household level. To this end, we simply 
average the amounts of old-age pension benefits received in couple households to represent 
the individualized pension at the household level.
28 We present both average pension 
benefits (Table 7) and their distribution (Table 8) across birth cohorts. 
Table 7  Average pension benefits (€ per month) at the household level across birth cohorts 
 Couples  Singles 
 West  East  West  East 
Cohorts     Men Women Men  Women 
1937-41 816 770  1,112 452  908  653 
1942-46 849 847  1,092 524  951  739 
1947-51 853 853  1,070 533  828  792 
1952-56 861 773  1,143 601  784  666 
1957-61 841 714  1,042 556  660  702 
1962-66 854 631  1,033 589  638  631 
1967-71 839 588  1,091 616  591  429 
Average 847 763  1,086 556  742  662 
Notes: For couple households pension benefits are averaged. The cohort is defined with respect to the age of 
the older spouse. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations. 
                                                  
28  Since we do not interpret pension levels in welfare terms, we refrain from calculating “equivalized” 
pension incomes using one of the usual scales.   27
For West German couples the average pension benefit per person remains fairly stable at 
about 850 € across birth cohorts. This corresponds to the evolution of individual pension 
benefits in West Germany described above: Its slight reduction for men is more or less 
compensated by its increase for women. In contrast, for East German couples there is a very 
strong negative trend in the level of average pensions across birth cohorts. Due to the 
relatively high pension benefits received by women, the level of the average pension benefit 
received by older birth cohorts of East German couples is similar to the level of West 
German couples in the same cohorts. The substantial decline of the average pension benefit 
of couples in East Germany from about 800 € to less than 600 € is the result of the drop of 
individual pensions among men and women in the younger birth cohorts. The evolution of 
pensions of singles, both in East and West Germany, is similar to what has been described 
above at the individual level. Hence, marital status of pensioners as such does not seem to 
effect pension benefits much. 
Table 8  Average pension benefits (€ per month) at the household level across birth cohorts 
 Couples  Singles 
 West  East  West  East 
Euro      Men Women Men Women 
  Cohorts 1937-71 
0-300  0.5 0.0 0.2  21.8 0.7 0.6 
301-600  12.6 10.2  4.0 35.6 20.0 31.6 
601-900  46.5 62.2 23.2 31.4 47.7 48.5 
901-1200 33.9 26.9 38.7  9.3 26.9 17.5 
1201-1500  6.0 0.7  24.4 1.6 3.8 1.8 
1501+  0.4 0.0 9.6 0.4 0.8 0.0 
  Cohorts 1937-51 
0-300  1.0 0.0 0.4  29.8 1.6 1.4 
301-600 14.4 5.4 3.4  31.7 5.7  26.5 
601-900  43.1 56.1 24.6 25.6 50.5 46.5 
901-1200 34.5 37.1 42.0  9.8 33.5 21.7 
1201-1500  6.5 1.4  21.9 2.5 7.0 3.9 
1501+  0.6 0.0 7.8 0.6 1.8 0.0 
  Cohorts 1952-71 
0-300  0.0 0.0 0.0  11.0 0.0 0.0 
301-600  10.6 14.9  4.5 40.8 32.9 36.0 
601-900  50.3 68.2 21.8 39.1 45.2 50.2 
901-1200 33.3 16.8 35.4  8.7 21.0 13.9 
1201-1500  0.3 0.0  27.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 
1501+  0.3 0.0  11.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Notes: For couple households pension benefits are averaged. The cohort is defined with respect to 
the age of the older spouse. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations.   28
Table 8 shows the distribution of pension benefits at the household level. Across all cohorts, 
the share of low pensions among couples is small compared to single women. Only about 10 
percent of couples in both East and West Germany have a pension of less than 600 € per 
person, compared to almost 60 percent of single women in West German and more than 30 
percent of this group in East Germany. In West Germany in particular, relatively high 
pensions of between 900 and 1200 € per person are much more common among couples 
than among single women. 
Looking at changes across birth cohorts, Table 8 displays a sharply increasing share of 
low pensions in East German couple households: among the younger birth cohorts, 15 
percent receive a pension of less than 600 €, compared to only 5 percent among the older 
cohorts. The share of relatively high pension benefits exceeding 900 € received by this group 
also falls substantially in the younger cohorts, from 38.5 to 16.8 percent. In contrast, the 
slight decline in the share of very low pensions among couples in West Germany is 
accompanied by a marked of relatively high pension in the younger birth cohorts.  
4.4  A more optimistic labor market scenario  
The simulations from the previous sections are based on estimated cohort effects which 
imply a rather pessimistic outlook for the future level of pension benefits of younger birth 
cohorts in East Germany. These cohort effects in employment patterns and relative wages 
are estimated on data from the period 1990-2005, which saw a dramatic increase in 
registered long-term unemployment in East Germany. Since we have to simulate 
employment and wage developments for up to 30 years in the future for the youngest birth 
cohort, these simulations very much depend on the question whether these cohort effects 
can be used to project labor market outcomes in the distant future. The effects of past 
unemployment on future pension benefits cannot be made disappear but future employment 
may not decline and unemployment increase as strongly as observed in the past in East 
Germany.  
Given the long projection period for the youngest cohorts and the uncertainty 
surrounding these projections, in the following we present simulation results derived under 
the scenario “positive labor market East Germany”. Instead of simulating future employment 
and unemployment durations using estimated cohort effects, we average these effects 
across all birth cohorts in this scenario. Hence, the sharp increase in the future duration of 
unemployment among younger birth cohorts is diminished relative to the baseline scenario. 
Given the improvement in future labor market conditions in this alternative scenario, we also 
assume that the effective retirement age of East Germans increases to the West German 
level, which implies a long-term increase of about one more year in East Germany.   29
The left part of Table 9 shows the simulation results for the individual pension benefit 
and the replacement rate in this scenario, the right part the changes relative to our base 
scenario. Across all birth cohorts, the pension benefit increases by about 8 percent, on 
average, in the scenario with a more positive labor market development in East Germany, 
with a somewhat stronger increase for women. The replacement ratio increases by about 
three percentage points, on average, to about 44 percent for men and 37 percent for women. 
Although the overall negative trend in the evolution of pension benefits across birth cohorts is 
not reversed, it becomes substantially weaker in this scenario. The reduction of the pension 
benefit in the youngest cohort is, on average, 11 percent less than in the base scenario, and 
the decline in the replacement rate is reduced by 6 percentage points. Somewhat weaker 
effects of a positive labor market on pension benefits and replacement rates in East 
Germany can be observed for the birth cohort 1962-66 and, still somewhat diminished, for 
the cohort 1957-61. 
 
Table 9  Pension benefits and replacement rates across birth cohorts 
scenario “positive labor market East Germany” 
Cohort Total  Men  Women  Total  Men  Women 
  Pension benefit  
(€ / month) 
Change relative to base scenario  
(in percent) 
1937-41  768  869  668 0.24  -2.07 3.40 
1942-46 872  1000  738  -0.41  -1.73  1.54 
1947-51  865  929  818 -1.31 -1.47 -1.17 
1952-56  802  863  752 1.33 1.70 0.98 
1957-61  771  765  776 3.71 4.77 2.77 
1962-66  728  772  692 6.90 6.78 7.01 
1967-71  646  733  570 11.00 11.52 10.42 
Average  791  858  732 8.49 7.84 9.52 
  Replacement rate 
(in percent) 
Change relative to base scenario  
(in percentage points) 
1937-41  37.3  42.2  32.5 0.1  -0.9 1.1 
1942-46  42.4  48.6  35.9 0.5 0.2 0.9 
1947-51  42.0  45.2  39.7 1.4 1.5 1.3 
1952-56  39.0  42.0  36.6 2.5 2.8 2.1 
1957-61  37.5  37.2  37.7 3.8 4.1 3.4 
1962-66  35.4  37.6  33.7 5.1 5.3 4.9 
1967-71  31.4  35.7  27.7 5.9 6.8 5.1 
Average  38.4  41.7  35.6 2.7 2.8 2.6 
Notes: The replacement rate is the ratio of the monthly pension benefit to the average monthly gross 
wage in East and West Germany, respectively. The distribution of pension benefits in the base scenario 
is documented in Table 5. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations. 
The comparison of the distribution of pension benefits across birth cohorts in our base and 
alternative scenario in Table 10 reveals a relatively strong reduction in the share of very   30
small pension benefits. In the younger age cohorts, the share of pensions below 600 € drops 
by 19 percentage points for men and 16 percentage points for women. This strong reduction 
would be accompanied by an increase in the share of monthly pensions of more than 900 € 
by almost 10 percentage points for men and 5 percentage points for women.  
 
Table 10  Distribution of pension benefits by income class across birth cohorts  
scenario “positive labor market East Germany” 
   
Share (in percent) 
Changes relative to base scenario 
(in percentage points) 
Euro Total  Men  Women  Total  Men    Women 
  Cohorts 1937-71 
0-300  0.6 0.2 1.1  -0.5 0.0  -0.8 
301-600  17.8  8.0  26.4 -10.9 -11.6 -10.4 
601-900  53.9 54.3 53.6  6.3  5.2  7.3 
901-1200  22.5 30.5 15.6  3.3  4.6  2.1 
1201-1500 4.7 6.4 3.2 1.7 1.8 1.6 
1501+  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.3  -0.6 0.0 
  Cohorts 1937-51 
0-300  1.2 0.4 1.9  -0.4 0.0  -0.7 
301-600  11.9  2.2  20.5 -1.8 -1.3 -2.2 
601-900  50.1 45.1 54.5  0.0  -0.4  0.4 
901-1200  29.0 40.3 18.8  0.3  0.6  0.0 
1201-1500 7.0  10.6 3.8 1.6 1.1 2.1 
1501+  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.7  -1.4 0.0 
  Cohorts 1952-71 
0-300  0.3 0.0 0.5  -0.5 0.0  -0.9 
301-600  22.1 12.2 30.5  -17.5 -19.2 -16.1 
601-900  56.7 61.1 52.9 10.9  9.3 12.2 
901-1200  17.9 23.3 13.4  5.4  7.6  3.5 
1201-1500 3.0 3.3 2.8 1.8 2.4 1.3 
1501+  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Notes:  The distribution of pension benefits in the base scenario is documented in Table 5. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations. 
The large differences in simulations results between the two scenario illustrate the 
importance of future labor market developments for the level and distribution of pension 
benefits of younger birth cohorts in East Germany. In our view, the alternative scenario 
seems rather optimistic since, at the individual level, it implies relatively weak effects of long-
term unemployment cumulated in early years on future employment patterns. Thus, younger 
birth cohorts will have to experience less unemployment between, say, age 40 and the 
retirement age than older cohorts in order to partially compensate for the much longer 
unemployment durations experienced by these cohorts in younger ages and the low pension 
rights that result from long-term unemployment since 2005. Labor market developments in   31
East Germany give little reason to be overly optimistic in this respect. Thus, our alternative 
scenario probably lies near to the upper bound of likely outcomes of the development of 
pension benefits in East Germany. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Our goal has been to quantify the likely impact of changing employment patterns and 
pension reforms on the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts in Germany. To 
this end, we have developed a microsimulation model which accounts for cohort effects in 
individual employment and unemployment and earnings over the lifecycle as well as the 
differential impact of recent pension reforms on birth cohorts. Using simulated life cycle 
employment and income profiles, we have shown that public pensions of East German men 
and women will fall dramatically among younger birth cohorts, not only because of policy 
reforms but due to higher cumulated unemployment. For West German men, the small 
reduction of average pension levels among younger birth cohorts is mainly driven by the 
impact of pension reforms, while future pension levels of West German women are 
increasing or stable due to increasing labor market participation among younger birth 
cohorts. These simulation results refer to our “base scenario” which takes into account the 
demographic adjustment factor and the long-term increase in the statutory retirement age 
introduced recently to stabilize the contribution rate to the public pension system.  
Regarding the distribution of individual pension benefits, for the younger birth cohorts 
of East German men and women our simulation results imply high shares of pensions below 
the minimum pension recently introduced to avoid poverty among pensioners. Furthermore, 
the distribution of pension benefits in the total population disguises important differences by 
the level of education which is one of the major factors shaping life-time earnings. Even in 
the group of West German men whose average pension level is relatively high also among 
younger age cohorts, a large share of those with a low level of education will obtain public 
pensions which are very close to the minimum pension, and that even the median pension of 
this group is only marginally above that level. While the very high share of individual 
pensions below the level of the social minimum among West German women will decline 
somewhat in the younger birth cohorts, it will increase dramatically for both men and women 
in East Germany. Also at the household level, the share of low pensions among married 
women will increase dramatically in younger birth cohorts in East Germany. 
Since these simulation results are based on projecting labor market developments 
observed in the past into the distant future for younger birth cohorts, which by necessity has 
to rely on highly uncertain assumptions especially for East Germany, we have also simulated 
the evolution of future pensions across birth cohorts under a more optimistic labor market 
scenario. This scenario implies that future employment patterns of younger birth cohorts will   32
resemble the average development over all cohorts since German reunification and that the 
effective retirement age of East Germans increases to the West German level. Even under 
this optimistic scenario, the overall negative trend in the evolution of pension benefits and the 
increasing share of low pensions across birth cohorts are not reversed, although it becomes 
substantially weaker. However, this latter scenario is probably too optimistic regarding the 
development of future pension benefits in East Germany.  
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Appendix 
Statistical Matching of SOEP and Pension Insurance Accounts 
The merging of SOEP and VSKT is performed by a statistical matching procedure to identify 
statistical twins. This is a common microsimulation method to combine data sets statistically 
when no unique identifier in two or more data sets is available (O’Hare 2000; D’Orazio et 
al. 2006).
29 
We apply a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching with replacement (see, e.g., 
Cameron and Trivedi, Ch.  25.4). That is, cases are matched for which the absolute 
difference in terms of the propensity score is minimized within 54 subsets of the data (“cells”) 
defined by age-groups, gender, region, education and insurance status. Within these cells, 
we further match on individual labor market characteristics and – for women – the number of 
children. Since education is a very important matching variable, which is missing for more 
than 40 percent of all observations in the VSKT, we can only use a sub-sample of about 
25,500 observations to match statistical twins to the about 12,800 observations in the SOEP 
data. We cannot include persons with foreign citizenship because they are not part of the 
VSKT. For them, pension benefits are simulated using the SOEP.  
The effectiveness of the matching procedure can be checked by testing the differences 
in the means of matching variables in the matched data set. Results of standard t-tests of the 
difference in means from two independent samples show that no statistically significant 
differences remain in any of the matching variables (see Geyer and Steiner  2010, 
Table A3-3). More interesting are any remaining differences in employment patterns in the 
base year 2005 and pension points that are not used as matching variables. As described in 
the text, pension points are simulated in the SOEP on the basis of retrospective data and 
directly available in the VSKT from cleared insurance accounts.  
Table A1 shows large differences in the means of these variables in the two data sets 
before matching, and differences remain statistically significant after matching in most cases. 
The average number of pension points after matching is significantly larger in the VSKT than 
in the SOEP in all groups, varying between 2.6  percentage points for East German women 
and almost 4  percentage points for women in West Germany. These relatively large 
differences result from both the longer cumulated employment durations of women recorded 
                                                  
29 SOEP has been matched to administrative data on pensions in several other studies. Rasner et al. 
(2007) analyse the complementarity with respect to data on pensioners of SOEP and 
administrative data from the Research Data Center of the Public Pension Fund. Frick and Grabka 
(2010) use a matched data set to analyse the social security wealth of the population. Krenz et al. 
(2009) match the insurance record sample to the large IAB employment sample (IABS).   34
in the VSKT and the much more precise recording of individual entitlement periods obtained 
during non-employment spells in the VSKT relative to those simulated on the basis of SOEP. 
data. This in particular concerns entitlement periods related to child-rearing activities of 
women, but also more generally to the way pension entitlement acquired in the GDR were 
counted after their integration in the West German pension system.    35
Additional Tables and Figures 
Table A1  Employment and unemployment durations (months) and pension points in 2005 in 
SOEP and the Pension Insurance Accounts (VSKT) before and after matching  
 SOEP VSKT  t p 
West Germany  Men 
Employment   227.5  259.2  -12.3  0.00 
 227.5  244.0  -5.3  0.00 
Unemployment  8.7 9.0  -0.8 0.44 
  8.7 6.7 4.2 0.00 
Pension points  25.3  29.2  -11.5  0.00 
 25.3  29.1  -8.8  0.00 
 Women 
Employment   181.7  205.3  -10.7  0.00 
 181.7  197.5  -6.1  0.00 
Unemployment   9.1  10.8  -4.6  0.00 
  9.1 8.6 1.2 0.23 
Pension points  12.6  17.0  -22.6  0.00 
 12.6  16.5  -18.8  0.00 
East Germany  Men 
Employment   249.4  276.5  -5.9  0.00 
 249.4  274.4  -4.9  0.00 
Unemployment    17.4  13.7 3.9 0.00 
 17.4  17.5  -0.1  0.94 
Pension points  24.7  28.0  -6.8  0.00 
 24.7  27.3  -5.2  0.00 
 Women 
Employment   244.9  250.4  -1.3  0.18 
  244.9  236.7 1.7 0.08 
Unemployment 24.9  23.5 1.1 0.26 
 24.9  25.1  -0.1  0.89 
Pension points  24.7  28.0  -6.8  0.00 
 24.7  27.3  -5.2  0.00 
Notes: For each variable, the first row shows its means in the SOEP and the VSKT before, the second 
row after the statistical matching. t  is the statistic for the test of statististical significance of the 
difference of the two means, p the probability value for this test.  
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations. 
Since pension entitlements in the PSIA are measured much more precisely than those 
derived from the SOEP, we substitute the latter by the former for all observations for which a 
statistical twin could be found in the matched data set in the base year  2005. We use 
simulated pension benefits derived from retrospective SOEP data only for those persons for 
whom no statistical twin could be found. In particular, this concerns people with foreign 
nationality who are not included in the PSIA data set,     36
Table A2  Marginal cohort effects in employment and unemployment histories from tobit 
estimates by region and level of education, men  
 Full-time  employment  Unemployment 
 ME  s.e.  ME  s.e. 
West Germany  Low level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  -1.11  0.17  0.11  0.06 
Cohort 1947-51  -1.48  0.18  0.33  0.06 
Cohort 1952-56  -0.99  0.21  0.94  0.07 
Cohort 1957-61  -1.87  0.22  1.57  0.08 
Cohort 1962-66  -2.69  0.24  2.37  0.08 
Cohort 1967-71  -2.81  0.26  2.02  0.09 
  Medium level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  -1.27  0.10  0.20  0.03 
Cohort 1947-51  -1.16  0.10  0.39  0.03 
Cohort 1952-56  -1.14  0.11  0.48  0.03 
Cohort 1957-61  -1.49  0.11  0.74  0.03 
Cohort 1962-66  -1.45  0.12  0.62  0.04 
Cohort 1967-71  -1.66  0.13  0.82  0.04 
  High level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  -0.75  0.16  0.55  0.03 
Cohort 1947-51  -0.97  0.16  0.63  0.03 
Cohort 1952-56  -1.16  0.17  0.83  0.04 
Cohort 1957-61  -1.10  0.18  1.02  0.04 
Cohort 1962-66  -1.04  0.18  0.86  0.04 
Cohort 1967-71  -1.42  0.20  0.96  0.04 
East Germany  Low/medium level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  -0.28  0.15  0.65  0.06 
Cohort 1947-51  -1.16  0.17  1.51  0.07 
Cohort 1952-56  -1.92  0.18  2.57  0.07 
Cohort 1957-61  -3.03  0.19  3.60  0.08 
Cohort 1962-66  -3.16  0.21  3.96  0.09 
Cohort 1967-71  -3.34  0.22  4.74  0.09 
  High level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  -0.35  0.17  0.22  0.04 
Cohort 1947-51  -1.95  0.20  0.64  0.04 
Cohort 1952-56  -2.64  0.22  0.72  0.05 
Cohort 1957-61  -3.17  0.25  1.19  0.06 
Cohort 1962-66  -3.64  0.29  1.44  0.06 
Cohort 1967-71  -5.08  0.34  2.20  0.07 
Notes:  ME := Marginal Effect = difference of the average cumulated duration of the respective 
cohort and the cohort 1937-41 (base category). s.e. := estimated standard error of cohort 
effect. All estimated marginal effects are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%-
level. Marginal effects are evaluated at sample means of explanatory variables in the tobit 
models. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations.   37
Table A3  Cohort effects in employment and unemployment histories from tobit estimates by 









  ME s.e. ME s.e. ME s.e. ME s.e. 
West Germany  Low level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  -0.89  0.19  0.43 0.10 0.22 0.03  -0.27 0.19 
Cohort 1947-51  -0.59  0.19  0.19 0.11 0.51 0.04  -0.80 0.19 
Cohort 1952-56  -0.17  0.22  0.90 0.12 0.91 0.04  -1.86 0.22 
Cohort 1957-61  -0.75  0.24  2.16 0.13 1.29 0.04  -2.31 0.24 
Cohort 1962-66  -1.38  0.26  2.55 0.15 1.51 0.05  -1.92 0.26 
Cohort 1967-71  -1.73  0.28  2.70 0.16 1.65 0.05  -2.05 0.28 
  Medium level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  0.81  0.15  0.78 0.10 0.11 0.02  -1.41 0.14 
Cohort 1947-51  1.14  0.15  1.69 0.10 0.13 0.02  -2.24 0.14 
Cohort 1952-56  1.11  0.16  1.87 0.10 0.28 0.03  -2.67 0.15 
Cohort 1957-61  0.89  0.16  2.64 0.11 0.36 0.03  -2.94 0.15 
Cohort 1962-66  0.57  0.17  3.15 0.12 0.55 0.03  -2.95 0.16 
Cohort 1967-71  0.67  0.19  3.35 0.13 0.24 0.03  -3.25 0.18 
  High level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  1.11  0.28  -0.15 0.17 0.21 0.05  -0.60 0.23 
Cohort 1947-51  2.27  0.29  0.06 0.17 0.57 0.05  -1.14 0.23 
Cohort 1952-56  1.74  0.29  1.01 0.17 0.90 0.05  -1.91 0.24 
Cohort 1957-61  1.68  0.30  1.69 0.18 0.77 0.05  -1.73 0.24 
Cohort 1962-66  1.77  0.31  1.66 0.19 0.73 0.05  -1.90 0.25 
Cohort 1967-71  1.57  0.33  1.87 0.20 0.47 0.06  -1.56 0.27 
East Germany  Low/medium level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  0.58  0.26  -0.89 0.17 1.41 0.07  -0.61 0.10 
Cohort 1947-51  0.23  0.29  -0.90 0.18 2.74 0.08  -1.10 0.11 
Cohort 1952-56  -1.00  0.32  -1.38 0.21 4.43 0.09  -0.93 0.13 
Cohort 1957-61  -1.74  0.35  -1.17 0.23 5.32 0.10  -0.97 0.14 
Cohort 1962-66  -3.78  0.39  -0.49 0.25 6.79 0.12  -0.59 0.15 
Cohort 1967-71  -5.79  0.42  -0.44 0.27 8.21 0.12 0.19 0.17 
  High level of education 
Cohort 1942-46  -1.69  0.32  0.67 0.19 0.41 0.06 0.19 0.10 
Cohort 1947-51  -1.53  0.34  1.20 0.20 0.91 0.07 0.03 0.11 
Cohort 1952-56  -2.14  0.36  1.00 0.22 1.20 0.08 0.14 0.12 
Cohort 1957-61  -3.32  0.38  1.91 0.23 1.47 0.08 0.37 0.13 
Cohort 1962-66  -5.53  0.42  3.25 0.25 2.46 0.09 0.99 0.13 
Cohort 1967-71  -6.94  0.47  4.65 0.28 3.05 0.10 1.60 0.15 
Notes:  ME := Marginal Effect = difference of the average cumulated duration of the respective cohort and the 
cohort 1937-41 (base category). s.e. := estimated standard error of cohort effect. All estimated marginal effects 
are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%-level. Marginal effects are evaluated at sample 
means of explanatory variables in the tobit models. 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations. 
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Table A4  Random-effects relative wage regressions, men 
 West  Germany  East Germany 
Education level  Low  Medium  High  Low/Medium  High 
non-employment duration  -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.32*** -0.21*** -0.56***
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
(non-employment duration)
2/100 1.08*** 0.69**  5.09*** 2.71*** 20.73***
 (0.37)  (0.31)  (0.68) (0.58) (2.79)
(non-employment duration)
3/100 -0.60*** -0.13  -2.38*** -1.43*** -25.26***
 (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.49) (0.49) (4.36)
age 5.41*** 6.25*** -0.95*** 0.13** 3.09
 (0.46)  (0.37)  (0.26) (0.06) (2.40)
age
2/100 -30.48*** -38.55*** 6.12*** -0.37 -21.57
 (3.31)  (2.54)  (1.32) (0.25) (14.77)
age
3/100 0.90*** 1.26*** -0.17*** 0.00  0.79*
 (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.03) (0.00) (0.48)
age
4/1000 -0.15*** -0.23*** 0.02*** -0.00  -0.16*
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.08)
Age
5/1000 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00***  0.00**
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.00)
Age
6/10000 -0.00*** -0.00***     -0.00**
 (0.00)  (0.00)      (0.00)
Other control variables included  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
σu 0.39  0.40  0.44  0.34  0.40
σe 0.24  0.20  0.22  0.21  0.22
Number of observations  9.958 24.884  13.840 7.844  4.780 
Number of individuals 1.622  3.864  2.376  1.252  751 
Notes: Random-effects estimation, with σu, σe estimated error components; s. e. in parentheses;   
* /  ** / ***:  statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level. All estimations include a 
constant and time effects; control variables are a dummies for German nationality and orthogonolized dummies 
for firm size and industry.  
Source: SOEP, own calculations 
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Table A5  Random-effects relative wage regressions, women 
 West  Germany  East Germany 
Education level  Low  Medium  High  Low/Medium  High 
non-employment duration  -0.05***  -0,14*** -0,14***  -0,07***  -0,09*** 
 (0.01)  (0,01)  (0,01) (0,01) (0,02) 
(non-employment duration)
2/100 0.20***  1,40***  1,28***  0,19*  -0,39 
 (0.05)  (0,09)  (0,24) (0,10) (0,39) 
(non-employment duration)
3/100 -0.04***  -0,59***  -0,53***  -0,01  0,57** 
 (0.01)  (0,05)  (0,15) (0,03) (0,24) 
(non-employment duration)
4/100   0,00***  0,00**     
   (0,00)  (0,00)     
part-time employment duration  -0.09*** -0,11***  -0,15*** -0,11*** -0,10*** 
 (0.01)  (0,01)  (0,01) (0,01) (0,01) 
(part-time employment duration)
2/100 1.10***  1,29***  2,07*** 1,32*** 1,27*** 
 (0.10)  (0,07)  (0,16) (0,14) (0,18) 
(part-time employment duration)
3/100 -0.48***  -0,54***  -1,06*** -0,57*** -0,66*** 
 (0.05)  (0,04)  (0,10) (0,08) (0,12) 
(part-time employment duration)
4/100 0.00***  0,00***  0,00*** 0,00*** 0,00*** 
 (0.00)  (0,00)  (0,00) (0,00) (0,00) 
Currently part-time employed  -0.89*** -0,84***  -0,83*** -1,04*** -0,80*** 
 (0.01)  (0,01)  (0,01) (0,02) (0,03) 
age 6.81***  8,53***  1,60*** 0,10  -1,43*** 
 (0.57)  (0,56)  (0,42) (0,09) (0,45) 
age
2/100 -41.88***  -54,49***  -7,74*** -0,31 7,85*** 
 (4.06)  (3,83)  (2,21) (0,35) (2,26) 
age
3/100 1.35***  1,82***  0,19*** 0,00  -0,20*** 
 (0.15)  (0,14)  (0,06) (0,01) (0,06) 
age
4/1000 -0.24***  -0,33***  -0,02***  -0,00  0,03*** 
 (0.03)  (0,03)  (0,01) (0,00) (0,01) 
age
5/1000 0.00***  0,00***  0,00***    -0,00*** 
 (0.00)  (0,00)  (0,00)    (0,00) 
age
6/10000 -0.00***  -0,00***       
 (0.00)  (0,00)       
σu  0.38 0,37  0,42 0,30 0,29 
σe  0.28 0,28  0,30 0,25 0,22 
Number of observations  9.482 19.648  8.190 6.544 5.528 
Number of individuals  1.696 3.420  1.619 1.191  808 
Notes: Random-effects estimation, with σu, σe estimated error components; s. e. in parentheses;   
* /  ** / ***:  statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%- / 5%- / 1%-level. All estimations include a 
constant and time effects; control variables are a dummies for German nationality and orthogonolized dummies 
for firm size and industry. G = Geringe Bildung, M = Mittlere Bildung, H = Höhere Bildung. 
Source: SOEP, own calculations 
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Table A6  Impact of pension reforms on the average pension benefit by birth cohort –  
women in West Germany, men and women in East Germany 
Szenario I  II  III  IV  II/I  III/I  IV/I 
  pension benefit (euro per month)  percentage change 
Women, West G.               
Cohort  1937-41  451 449 451 449 -0,3 0,1 -0,3 
Cohort  1942-46  552 538 554 540 -2,6 0,4 -2,2 
Cohort  1947-51  570 538 577 544 -6,1 1,2 -4,8 
Cohort  1952-56  588 543 606 560 -8,3 3,0 -5,1 
Cohort  1957-61  581 522 603 542  -11,3 3,7 -7,2 
Cohort  1962-66  666 581 694 606  -14,5 4,0 -9,9 
Cohort  1967-71  659 566 688 591  -16,4 4,3 -11,5 
Total  590 540 606 554 -9,2 2,6 -6,4 
Men, East G.               
Cohort  1937-41  887 886 887 886 -0,1 0,0 -0,1 
Cohort 1942-46  1.017  993  1.020  996  -2,5  0,3  -2,2 
Cohort  1947-51  943 890 953 898 -6,0 1,0 -5,0 
Cohort  1952-56  849 784 870 804 -8,2 2,5 -5,5 
Cohort  1957-61  730 657 756 680  -11,1 3,4 -7,4 
Cohort  1962-66  723 635 756 663  -14,0 4,3 -9,1 
Cohort  1967-71  658 566 690 594  -16,2 4,7 -10,7 
Total  843 786 860 801 -7,3 2,0 -5,2 
Women, East G.               
Cohort  1937-41  646 646 646 646 0,0  0,0  0,0 
Cohort  1942-46  727 718 729 720 -1,2 0,3 -0,9 
Cohort  1947-51  827 786 834 792 -5,3 0,8 -4,5 
Cohort  1952-56  745 691 763 708 -7,8 2,4 -5,2 
Cohort  1957-61  755 685 779 706  -10,3 3,0 -7,0 
Cohort  1962-66  647 570 672 592  -13,5 3,7 -9,2 
Cohort  1967-71  516 447 538 466  -15,5 4,0 -10,9 
Total  715 667 729 680 -7,2 2,0 -5,1 
Szenario I   – Retirement age = 65, without adjustment of current pension value (CPV) 
Szenario II  – Retirement age = 65, with adjustment of CPV  
Szenario III – Retirement age = 67, without adjustment of CPV  
Szenario IV – Retirement age = 67, with adjustment of CPV (base scenario) 
Source: SOEP, SUFVSKT2005, SUFRTZN06XVSBB, own calculations. 
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Figure A1  Relative earnings-experience profiles by level of education 
a) Men, West Germany           c) Men, East Germany 
 
b) Women, West Germany          d) Women, East Germany 
   
Source: Own calculations based on estimated cohorts effects in Tables A2 and 3 and relative wage regressions in Tables A4 and A5.     42
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